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Oil discovery has been of economic benefit to most developed countries while it has 
brought curse to the economies of most developing countries. The difference, upon inves-
tigation in this thesis, was of the managerial principles adopted among these two catego-
ries of countries. The generally acclaimed managerial principles of oil wealth are investi-
gated in these crucial areas: Macroeconomic, which was made up of fiscal management 
and exchange rate policy; second, ensuring fairness and equity in oil wealth distribution, 
that is dealing with inequalities that occur mostly in oil-rich nations; third, Dealing with 
multinational oil companies, which comprises of the type of auction design and bidder pre-
ference; fourth, Oil management laws, which also include setting account for oil revenue, 
transparency, accountability and, oversight and control of oil revenue. 
 
When these key principles are ignored, oil-rich country could suffer from environmental 
destructions, Dutch disease syndrome (shrinking other sectors of the economy), poverty, 
inequalities and unemployment, ineffective rule of law, attitude of rent-seeking,  greater 
risk of conflicts and war, and nondemocratic state.  
 
In the context of Ghana‟s current economic status, certain key managerial principles are 
drawn from the generally accepted principles and also the experience of other resource-
rich countries. There are two major macroeconomic challenges that Ghana faces. First, is 
how to deal with the characteristic frequently changing oil price and the volatility of its 
output and Second, is its recurrent fiscal imbalance. The former could be resolved through 
manipulating the oil revenue share to be deposited into the national budget and making 
investment with the remainder overseas. By establishing a permanent fund, where only 
the interest on that fund is transferred to the budget is necessary to deal with the latter 
problem.  
 
Ghana also needs structural transformation. Agricultural productivity growth and diversifi-
cation of the economy away from oil production. It means the country‟s agricultural sector 
which accounts for greater percentage of its workforce should be strengthened and value-
addition to the primary products which means heavy industrialization. However, Ghana 
should invest massively on public and merit goods which in turn will promote growth in 
the sectors mentioned above. The famous Dutch disease is of no essence if oil revenue is 
invested in public goods rather than consumption. 
 Abstract 
 
 Good governance, transparency and accountability are of greater essence to Ghana in the 
proper management of its oil wealth. Drawing from Ghana‟s experience with the mining 
industry, there was lack of transparency and favourable laws that served as incentives for 
rent-seeking behavior. Laws that mandate independent bodies to oversee the manage-
ment of the oil rents and the public disclosure of information concerning all oil dealings 
among the oil companies and the government are paramount to the effective manage-
ment of the oil rent. Ghana should also make its compliance to the EITI mandatory to help 
solve the transparency problem that has bedeviled its mining industry.  
 
Lastly, environmental concerns are of equal greater importance to Ghana‟s economic 
growth. There should be environmental laws that would ensure that multinational oil com-
panies comply with environmental regulations to prevent a major disaster to the environ-
ment.       
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1 Introduction 
 
Ghana started the exploration and production of oil and gas in 1896. However, it was 
known that Signal & Amaco Group made the first commercial discovery in 1970. This 
was at Saltpond in the central part of Ghana. The recoverable oil reserves were esti-
mated at 4.9 million barrels. The production at this field began in 1978 by Agripetco, 
producing a total of 4,800 barrels each day (modernghanaonline 2009). In 1985, when 
production decreased to 580 barrels per day, the field was eventually closed down. 
Production however resumed in year 2000 and now produces about 600 barrels per 
day (Ghana National Petroleum Corporation 2006). Active research began in the 1980‟s 
by Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC). The Ghana government, with the 
aim of owning the reserves when discovery were made, decided to fund the explora-
tion. This approach by the government towards the exploration was not successful due 
to the high cost associated with the exploration. 
 
In 2001, the government of Ghana decided to move away from the nation-centric ap-
proach to all inclusive approach which served as an incentive to participation of private 
bodies. The change in taxes and other levies on oil production during the second quar-
ter of the year 2003 led to the involvement of several major international oil and gas 
firms like Tullow, Kosmos and Gasop. With the involvement of private interest groups 
alongside a re-equipped GNPC, new discoveries of oil and gas in commercial quantities 
were made by both Kosmos and Tullow in what is known as the Jubilee field. This field 
has a reserves of about 800 million barrels of light crude oil with an upside potential of 
about 3 billion barrels (Commerce Ghana 2010). Indeed other discoveries have since 
been made and are yet to be developed. 
 
Ever since oil was discovered in large quantities, there have been several suggestions 
on how the government should use the oil and gas resources of the country for the 
greater economic benefits of its citizens. Many stakeholders including politicians, jour-
nalists and economic experts have added their opinion on how the oil rents must be 
utilized to achieve greater economic prosperity for the country. It is in this light the 
subject ”oil discovery: a blessing or a curse” has been an important and major debat-
ing point across the length and breadth of the country.  
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Oil discovery brings enormous excitement and anxiety to the citizens of those nations 
with the hope of greater economic transformation. The oil discovery can affects Gha-
na‟s economy either positively or negatively. This depends on the managerial principles 
and models that would be deployed in the exploration process and the management of 
the oil rents for the total benefit of each individual in the society. It is therefore neces-
sary to put in place conducive managerial settings to ensure that the positive effects 
are maximized whereas the negative effects are minimized. 
  
This much is certain: large oil revenue (compared to the size of the economy) will have 
a significant impact. New oil rents flows, or a significant increase in existing ones, will 
transform an economy for better or worse. Usually expectations are high. Disappoint-
ment often follows. Certainly, oil revenue has the potential to make an economy bet-
ter-off but it also produces large risks that the potential benefits will not fully be rea-
lized or indeed, that it may make an economy worse-off than before (Najman, Pomfret 
& Raballand 2007). 
   
This thesis discusses the possibilities of oil as a blessing or a curse to Ghana‟s econo-
my. To understand the subject matter, this thesis outlines the positive impact that is 
made up primarily of macro-economic effects and micro-economic effects that Ghana 
could experience due to the oil find. In addition, the thesis also discusses the negative 
impact that may occur if the oil resource is mismanaged. Furthermore, Ghana‟s expe-
rience of management with the mining industry is discussed. Best practices for realiz-
ing a sustainable economic growth and development as a result of the oil boom are the 
subject of the next chapter. Again, comparisons of practices in a developed country 
that has performed well and in a developing country that has done badly in the oil 
windfall managements are set as lessons for Ghana. Finally, recommendations based 
on Ghana‟s current economic situation are outlined. 
2 Theoretical framework 
 
The “paradox of plenty” is what most social scientists use to describe the “resource 
curse” that befalls many resource-rich economies. Nations with large deposit of natural 
resources, such as oil and gas most often perform worse with regards to economic 
development and good governance than do countries with fewer resources (Sachs & 
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Warner 1995:69). Strangely, despite enormous wealth and opportunities that is asso-
ciated with oil discovery, such endowments many times impede rather than further 
balanced and sustainable development. In country after country, natural resource ex-
traction has helped raised living standard while failing to produce self-sustaining 
growth (Sachs & Warner 1995:69). In addition to these growth failures, there is the 
high possibility of weak democratic development (Ross 2001), corruption (Sala-i-Martin 
& Subramanian 2003), and even civil war (Humphreys 2005). 
 
However, Weisbrot et al (2006) assert that there is a great level of variation on the 
prospects of natural resource among resource-rich countries. Some resource-rich coun-
tries, usually developed ones, have performed far better than their counterparts in the 
developing world. For example, about three decades ago, Indonesia and Nigeria had 
comparable per capita incomes and heavy dependencies on oil sales. Yet today, Indo-
nesia‟s per capita income is almost four times that of Nigeria (Ross 2003). The basic 
question to ask is that what Indonesia did right that Nigeria could not do?,  As Hannes-
son (2001) explains, perhaps investing in the highest-returning assets such as basic 
infrastructure is the best way to make resource wealth permanent.  Again, Weisbrot et 
al (2006) argue that the varied effects of resource wealth on well-being can also be 
found within the country as well. Resource-endowed countries often suffer from a high 
level of inequality even though they have performed well. As Sarraf and Jiwanji (2001) 
elucidate resource wealth is often in the possession of a few corporations and also the 
public elites which serves as an incentive for rent-seeking activities. The wealth has 
benefited mostly the elites in the resource-rich countries through certain dubious prac-
tices. 
 
The curse of natural resource on political and economic prospects in developing coun-
tries raises many unanswerable policy questions for governments of developing coun-
tries and for the international community. To name a few, should the World Bank offer 
financial support for the extraction of Chad‟s oil reserves: if so, under what conditions? 
Should Mexico sell out its state-owned oil companies to private entities? Should Nige-
ria‟s state-owned oil corporation be changed into fully privatised commercial company? 
What has been the achievement of the stabilization fund so far in oil-rich developing 
nations? 
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Methodology: This piece of academic writing was carried out mainly with the use of 
qualitative research. It was much easier with this type of design due to the low cost of 
accessibility to information and less time required. Resource and time constraint were 
considered. Primarily, the needed data and information was gathered through secon-
dary sources: reliable text books, journals/magazine articles, news, magazines, com-
mentaries and internet. However, initial plans to resort to primary source of informa-
tion as well proved futile as all efforts to have telephone interviews with some major 
stakeholder representatives were not successful. The secrecy involved in the oil indus-
try could be a factor. 
  
First, a thorough search for relevant materials in this subject area was carried out.  
The materials were gathered from the school library and some relevant literatures 
were also found via the internet. In-depth readings were done where most common 
literatures about the subject matter were noted, analysed and evaluated. Some vital 
lessons were drawn from them and inculcated into this piece of academic work. More-
over, observing the trend on this subject, in most cases, there was room to analyze 
relevant issues central to addressing the research problem. This offered the opportu-
nity to brainstorm and find other viable solutions to the problems considered. 
Finally, the gathered data were processed in a way that best could solve the problems 
in the discussion and general conclusions were drawn to finalize the issues concerned 
about the subject matter.   
3 Literature review 
 
Oil discovery has occurred in many countries around the globe. Many experts in this 
field have added their view on how the rent accruing from the extraction must be 
managed to ensure it benefits the entire population of the nation in which the discov-
ery was carried out. However, there have also been suggestions on its negative impli-
cations when not properly managed. This thesis gathers evidence, classifies and ana-
lyzes it critically and draws conclusion in comparison with what has already been dis-
cussed. 
   
Hannesson (2001) discusses  the question of making resource wealth permanent, ar-
guing that the best strategy is to invest resource revenues in the highest-returning 
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assets, such as education, health, roads and other infrastructure in developing coun-
tries like Ghana. This is however true in the sense that “effective infrastructure supply 
supports economic growth, enhances quality of life and it is vital for national security‟‟ 
(Baldwin & Dixon 2008:32). For it is with the provision of infrastructure that the cur-
rent and future generations will be happier than with some unknown value of money 
deposited in a bank oversees from which political elites will be using to enrich them-
selves. In this season of global financial hardship, one cannot be sure that this amount 
of money will be available in some years to come when the reserves are dried up. 
  
Macroeconomic policy implementation research has been instituted to counter the 
negative effects of oil of a growing resource industry that overshadows other indus-
tries, promotes massive borrowing and public spending, and suppresses growth in the 
long-run. Davis et al. (2001) consider the function and misuse of savings and stabiliza-
tion funds in managing non-renewable resource wealth. They argue that the existence 
of funds have rarely been able to address the issue of volatility in oil prices and espe-
cially that of savings for future use to the expected standard and hence there seems to 
be a strong case for government to be cautious about policies pertaining to oil reve-
nue. The principle underlying the stabilization fund is applaudable. However, govern-
ment should be cautious about the use of the resources saved in the fund as sug-
gested above by Davis et al. (2001). It should not be used as a source of fund to cover 
up the shortfalls in the general budget whether they occur as a result of oil price vola-
tility or not. The use of the fund to supplements the shortfall in non-oil revenue should 
be prohibited otherwise it will encourage government to relax in the mobilization of 
traditional revenue which could promotes indiscipline in the fiscal policy process that 
can feed into dependence on oil fund. 
  
Sachs & Warner (1995) identified that resource sectors have weak linkages with the 
rest of the economy because imported inputs and capital-intensive production generate 
little employment; therefore, the real impact on the overall economy depends on how 
the wealth is used. The capital intensiveness in exploiting oil in most developing coun-
tries has transferred employment power to the foreign investors who have the neces-
sary capital to invest. This however creates fewer jobs for the local people than is ex-
pected. This situation leaves the government share of the revenue as the major tool 
for greater economic transformation. In this sense only good management policies will 
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ensure that the nation benefits significantly from the oil discovery. Sachs and Warner 
(1995) again argue that oil abundance is a key negative determinant of economic 
growth. These empirical results are themselves controversial but the point here is to 
argue that the criterion itself is not sufficient. Lower growth in the long run does not 
necessarily mean that the oil is a curse. A country can experience a windfall, which 
raises income and consumption in all periods but does not produce faster growth, and 
indeed it may even slow growth. Even if growth slows after the windfall, consumption, 
the usual aggregative measure of welfare, may still remain higher in all periods be-
cause disposable income is higher than if the economy had not had a windfall but had 
grown faster. Thus, the empirical observation referred to above, that resource abun-
dant economies tend to have lower aggregative growth, is not in itself sufficient to 
demonstrate that oil is a curse. 
  
Saraf & Jiwanji (2001) outline many reasonable issues of the resource curse. Firstly, 
the increased sudden availability of foreign exchange, if not managed well, causes a 
significant appreciation of real exchange rate, further damaging the competiveness of 
manufacturing and other tradable industries. Meltdown of the manufacturing industry 
may also lead to less educational investment and labour productivity. Unsuccessful 
protectionist policies are another frequent end result. This number of problems, known 
as Dutch Disease ( whereby the local currency of a nation appreciates which encour-
ages lower prices of non-traded export produce as a result of which exports are dis-
couraged) is less important for resources that are exploited at a sub-national level.  
However, at the national level, Dutch disease has been a major problem in managing 
oil wealth. In this instance there is an uncontrollable appreciation of a country‟s cur-
rency over the medium to long-term period. In the situation of a developing nation like 
Ghana, this can lead to a situation where Ghana‟s currency, the cedi price for export 
products such as timber, pineapples, cocoa and other non-traditional export products 
will be so low that farmers and other exporters would feel discouraged. This situation 
can destroy the agricultural and non-traditional export industries if not managed with 
care. However, Dutch disease can be managed by either investing in foreign bonds, 
paying off most of foreign debts or more so in engaging in public infrastructure in-
vestment such as public goods and merit goods. 
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 A second problem is that the volatility nature of prices and production quantity of pri-
mary goods, lead to highly fluctuating exports and government revenues. Higher pro-
duction and price times can create fiscal indiscipline, leading to market discipline re-
laxation. Saraf & Jiwanji (2001) assert that boom-based borrowing to expand public 
infrastructure can lead to unsustainable expenditures and burdensome debt after the 
boom. Moreover, once there is an expansion of government‟s expenditures, their con-
traction may be difficult. Boom times associated with capital inflow can lead to in-
creased careless spending which can result in a higher inflation rate and lower levels of 
domestic savings. During bad times, there will not be enough funds to cater for the 
budget deficit which can force government to abandon most developmental projects. 
  
Finally, Saraf & Jiwanji (2001) argue that since resource wealth tends to be possessed 
by a few companies and the public elites, rent-seeking behaviour is often a problem. 
Most of the resource wealth is possessed by powerful foreign investors, bureaucrats 
and some influential private investors. They engage in all forms of rent-seeking activi-
ties to maximize wealth for themselves alone. This therefore deprives ordinary citizens 
from benefiting from the resource wealth. Institutions built of strong accountability and 
transparency can be used to avert this unpleasant situation to ensure greater economic 
benefit for all.   
4 Positive effects of Ghana’s oil discovery 
 
Oil production arguably brings enormous blessings to the people of oil-rich countries 
when all appropriate measures are deployed to manage all the wealth associated with 
it. Some of the major benefits that the oil activities could bring to the Ghanaian econ-
omy are discussed below  
4.1 Macro-economics 
 
Macroeconomics deals with the performance, structure, and behaviour of a national or 
regional economy as a whole. It involves economy-wide issues such as fiscal policy, 
inflation, and economic growth and development (Driscoll 2001:9). The positive impact 
of Ghana‟s oil discovery on the performance and behaviour of the economy are ana-
lyzed in terms of Gross domestic product (GDP), foreign exchange and fiscal expan-
sion. 
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Ghana is placed among the group of countries with a lower middle income following a 
threefold increase of its real gross domestic product (GDP) (African economic outlook 
2010). The significant increase in Ghana‟s real GDP rate from 4.7% in 2009 to 5.9% in 
2010 signifies how strong Ghana‟s economic growth has been over these years. 
Growth strengths are even higher as real GDP of 12% growth rate and about 11.0% 
GDP are anticipated for the years 2011 and 2012 respectively relying on the start of 
earnings from the oil production which began in December 2010 (African economic 
outlook 2010). Furthermore, the country‟s stable democratic and stable social envi-
ronments have boosted foreign investors‟ confidence, triggering a rise in investment. 
  
However, setbacks remain, such as a very weak fiscal position and fragile external bal-
ances. Growing fiscal challenges include large domestic payment arrears (African eco-
nomic outlook 2010). Furthermore, the government‟s newly adopted public sector 
payment policy known as the single spine salary policy: A structural adjustment pro-
gram to address the issues of pay disparities, fairness, transparency and equity in the 
public sector, needs a high budgetary cost which could undermine macroeconomic 
stability unless government intensifies its efforts in mobilizing domestic revenues. 
Strong and sustainable investment over many years will need perpetual high levels of 
investments especially in the manufacturing sector, and in public infrastructure; this 
will be conditional on proper policies regarding the oil wealth management. Further-
more, the government should create training opportunities to equip the unskilled la-
bour force with relevant job skills to overcome the unemployment and underemploy-
ment challenges.      
4.1.1 GDP increment 
 
First, the Jubilee field is expected to yield initially 120,000 barrels per day increasing to 
about 240,000 barrels per day and yielding on average about $5 billion worth of crude 
oil and gas as an addition to Ghana‟s national GDP (Modernghanaonline 2009). This 
will increase GDP from $18 billion in 2010 to an estimated $23 billion in 2011, immedi-
ately increasing growth rate by 28% (The World Bank 2009). With about 23 million 
population, it means that there will be per capita GDP increment of an estimated value 
of $213 from 2010 with a value of about $769 to 2011 with a value of about $982 as a 
result of the oil discovery. As GDP gauges the health of a nation‟s economy, it there-
fore means that Ghana‟s economy could grow by 28% which will be a significant 
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achievement. With more wells discovered and in the process of development, Ghana 
can be hopeful of further economic growth increments. 
4.1.2 Foreign exchange availability 
 
Second, the oil find will transform the external position of Ghana. It is estimated that 
about $1 billion revenue will be available directly to the government through the for-
eign exchange on oil export (World Bank 2009). Furthermore, the foreign exchange 
would further increase in Ghana as a result of the money that would be brought in by 
foreign oil companies to cater for domestic expenditures such as rent and paying for 
local labour and other acquisitions. These transactions will improve the availability of 
foreign exchange and help resolve the usual foreign exchange shortages and the re-
lated depreciation of the cedi, Ghana‟s local trading currency, bringing the country into 
an era of continuous exchange rate appreciation of the cedi with respect to currencies 
of major trading countries. The country‟s current account deficit can also be improved 
considerably due to the foreign exchange availability.  
4.1.3 Fiscal expansion 
 
Fiscally, experts say about $1 billion oil revenue will be available to the government 
from the Jubilee field (The World Bank 2009). This will encourage fiscal budget expan-
sion allowing for rapid spending on development activities and projects such as basic 
social amenities and infrastructure without hurting the stability of macroeconomic im-
plementation. Moreover, it will discourage borrowing by government from banking and 
other financial institutions. This situation will make more loans available to the private 
sector to enable it effectively contributes to the overall development of the economy.   
4.2 Micro-economics 
 
Micro-economies can be described as part of the national economy which concerns 
activities of stakeholders such as: individual firms, household and consumers. The atti-
tudinal changes Ghana‟s oil boom could bring upon individual firms, household and 
consumers in Ghana could be discussed in terms of employment creation and con-
sumer spending. 
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4.2.1 Employment creation 
 
There is no doubt about the fact that direct and indirect jobs will be created which will 
ease the unemployment situation in the country. Some locals will be employed directly 
on the rigs. However, that number may be few. There should be active encouragement 
to engage the local entrepreneurs in the emerging oil industry. However, that partici-
pation will be small due to the sector‟s capital intensiveness. There should be an initia-
tion if the nation is to avoid the same situation as it had happened in other natural 
resource exploitation such as gold and bauxite whereby local entrepreneurs were not 
given financial incentives and other entrepreneurial aid and skills to engage in that 
industry but rather foreign firms with powerful financial backing took over the industry. 
It is advisable to encourage Ghanaians who desire to take risk to succeed in business 
through commendations and other business advice. The politics of envy presently hap-
pening in Ghana will not help build a new Ghana of economic prosperity. 
 
 Furthermore, the creation of downstream businesses which includes oil refineries and 
petrochemical industries are highly possible. There is also the potential of allied busi-
nesses such as salt manufacturing. The movement of workers to and from the rig will 
also encourage the need to creates both air and sea transportation services. The ex-
pansion of business such as banks, restaurants, vendor shops and real estates will also 
occur.  
 
The extended positive effects of the newly created businesses to the economic boom 
of local communities around the rig site and nonetheless to the overall economy will be 
great. However, these developments need to be exploited with greater care to realize 
economic benefits. For example, the choice of floating production storage offloading 
system as a production method can limit the development of downstream businesses 
such as refinery and other petrochemical industries thus limiting the value addition and 
employment creation potential (Modernghanaonline 2009).  
4.2.2 Consumer spending 
 
Economists claim that consumers cultivate the habits of spending when there is more 
money in their pockets. This becomes the trend when oil wealth starts flowing in a 
country. As oil cash begins to flow in a country, this will have a positive effect on com-
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pensation of employees. Employees experience a significant pay rise which therefore 
encourage more spending. Government may be tempted to introduce tax relief on 
workers‟ salaries as it may tend to rely heavily on the oil rent for revenue mobilization. 
This situation could create a pay rise which could serve as incentive for more people 
willing to work. Government spending may increase, with the increase going primarily 
into public sector wages, pensions, consumer subsidies for expensive products and 
social services.  
5 Negative effects of Ghana’s oil discovery 
 
Political scientists often talk of “oil curse‟‟ emphasising that resource-rich countries  
often are slow in growth,  corrupt, less equitable, violence prone, and with more au-
thoritarian government compared with those with fewer resources. There is a strong 
association between resource wealth and the likelihood of weak democratic develop-
ment (Ross 2001), corruption (Salai-Martin and Subramanian 2003) and civil war 
(Humphreys 2005). 
   
To understand the nature of natural resources, we need to comprehend what differen-
tiate natural resource wealth from other wealth types. There are two major issues in-
volved in this sense. The first issue is that natural resource wealth, compared with 
other sources of wealth, need not to be produced. It simply needs to be extracted 
(Ross 2001). In “The paradox of plenty”, Terry Lynn Karl (1997:52a) contends that 
since it is not a result of a typical production process, the creation of natural resource 
wealth can occur quite independently of other economic processes that occur in a 
country. For example, its creation can occur without depending on other industries of 
the economy and also a greater number of the domestic workforce. 
  
Natural resource extraction can also take place quite independently of other political 
processes; a government can often access natural resource wealth regardless of 
whether it commands the cooperation of its citizens or effectively controls institutions 
of state (Ross 2001). The second major issue is about the non-renewable characteris-
tics of many natural resources such as gas and oil. From an economic view point, they 
are thus less like a source of income and more like an asset (Ross 2001). 
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These two features; the isolation of the oil sector from domestic political and economic 
processes and the non-renewable nature of oil resource give rise to a large array of 
political and economic processes that produce adverse effects on an economy (Hum-
phreys et al. 2007). 
5.1 Macro-economic impact  
 
As the oil boom could create macro-economic growth, however, it could also cause 
serious inconveniences to macro-economic growth. The major macro-economic incon-
veniences that could occur to Ghana‟s economic growth effort includes the following.  
5.1.1 Dutch disease 
 
The oil revenue will creates serious negative impact on the economy if it is not man-
aged properly. This means that the oil wealth could encourage indiscipline with mone-
tary management. The sudden increase in foreign exchange as a result of an apprecia-
tion in the value of oil export can lead to an uncontrollable appreciation of Ghana‟s 
local currency, the cedi, over the medium term to long term period. This can result in a 
situation where the cedi price of exports such as cocoa, pineapple and other non-
traditional export products will be so low to discourage farmers and other exporters or 
too high to encourage buyers (Modernghanaonline 2009). This phenomenon is referred 
to as „‟Dutch Disease‟‟. Eventually, domestic materials and land resources are pulled to 
the natural resource industry. Adversely, the domestic market encounters higher price 
resource sales, thereby adding to the costs of production in other industries. This could 
destroy Ghana‟s agricultural and non-traditional export industry if such occurrence is 
mismanaged. A typical example could be cited in Nigeria; a sharp rise in Nigeria‟s pe-
troleum exports in the 1960s and early 1970s lead to an appreciation of the exchange 
rate. The higher exchange rate made it virtually impossible for firms in the agriculture 
and manufacturing sectors to sell their goods profitably abroad (Ross 2003). Booming 
oil exports crowded out agriculture and manufacturing exports, and hence, jobs in 
these sectors (Ross 2003). The economy can be affected negatively, as employees will 
have to be retrained and search for new jobs, and the distribution of capital needs to 
undergo readjustment.  
  
Again, the shift that would be caused by the Dutch disease could create another side 
effect. This can be described as the inequality in income distribution; if revenues from 
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other export industries such as manufacturing and farming are equitably distributed 
than revenues from natural resource, then this industrial shift can cause a rise in ine-
quality. By and large, the Dutch disease is a major worry down the end; when activities 
in the oil resource sector eventually slow down, other sectors of the economy will find 
it difficult to recover (Ross 2003). 
5.1.2 Income volatility 
 
The Dutch disease syndrome emerges as a result of increased availability of oil reve-
nue; other devastating effects occur due to the timing of oil rent earnings. Revenues 
from oil production if considered as a source of income are highly volatile (Ross 2001). 
There are three sources of the volatility: the variation over time in rates of extraction, 
the variability in the timing of payments by corporations to states, and fluctuations in 
the value of the oil produced (Humphreys 2009). Let consider figure 5.1 to demon-
strate the first two variability sources. This indicates earnings projection for Chad from 
the sale of oil over the period 2004-2034. Initially, the oil price rises sharply, a rapid 
fall immediately follows, then again another rise, and finally, a decline. This occurrence 
comes from two different sources. The first is the time variation in the extraction rate. 
A typical pattern is to have front-loading of extraction rates since production volumes 
tend to reach a peak within the first few years of production and then gradually de-
scend until production stops (Ross 2001). Practically, there is a higher risk that Chad‟s 
oil sales volatility will further increase through the conflicts within the producing re-
gions. The second major source of volatility occurs from the nature of the agreement 
between the producing companies and the government (Ross 2001). In the Chad case, 
some oil firms were exempted from taxes on earnings for the first years of production 
(Ross 2001). As taxes contribute significantly to government revenues, Chad‟s revenue 
base should improve at the institution of taxes. 
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Figure 5.1 Revenues to Chad, Base Case 917 MM BBLs, US$15.25/BBL. 
Source: World Bank inspection panel (2000) 
 
The third major source of volatility arises from the highly volatile nature of oil and gas 
prices. Figure 5.2 shows the price of oil over a period of 20 years. Note that while 
there is a very clear upward trend over these years, the variation around this trend is 
very great with week on week changes of plus or minus 5 to 10 percent relatively 
common (Ross 2001). 
 
 
Figure 5.2 All countries spot price weighted by estimated export volume (US dollars per barrel) 
Source: World Bank inspection panel (2000) 
 
5.1.3 Democracy threats 
 
Aside these economic and financial concerns, there are also the political dynamics as-
sociated with oil dependence that can exacerbate the oil curse. As earlier mentioned, 
oil-rich economies are prone to political instability, higher corruption levels, and, in 
Africa at least, to suffer from tribal uprising within their countries.  In effect, oil money 
can enable leaders to suppress their political rivals, and successfully secure their grasps 
on power to avoid election defeat. A clear example could be cited in Gabon where the 
late president, Omar Bongo used Gabon‟s oil wealth to protect himself in power for 
more than two decades until his untimely death in June 2009. The opposition were too 
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weak to win presidential polls in Gabon and Mr Bongo succeeded in integrating most of 
the opposition into the government. The ability of the government to rely solely on oil 
money to finance government spending makes it difficult for the government to leave 
power for access to traditional tax. National oil companies can serve as a power base 
for nondemocratic governments as well as a source of internal corruption (Soros 
2007). They are however, liable, to worsen the agency problem (government, the 
agent of the oil exploration does not serve the interest of the principals, the citizens of 
oil-rich countries) at the governmental level. Oil rents provide a nondemocratic gov-
ernment both with the financial means and the incentive to maintain itself in power. 
Mostly, during elections, government rely heavily on monies from state oil companies 
to rig polls because the state oil companies are not liable to the public. George Soros 
(2007) argues that “when the rulers have access to revenues that do not pass through 
the national budget, or the budgets are not transparent, there is an agency problem 
and democracy is endangered”. 
5.1.4 Environmental pollution 
 
Environmental problems are inevitable when oil has to be extracted from the ground. 
Oil spills, damaged lands, accidents and fires, and incidents of air and water pollution 
have all been recorded at various times and places (E&P Forum/UNEP 1997).It is cer-
tain this will also be the case in Ghana during the exploration of the oil find. However, 
proper management practices, technologies and procedures can be used to minimize 
these effects. The continued coordination among stakeholders such as oil firms, con-
tractors and suppliers is essential to implement the best environmental management 
practices to accentuate the negative effect that could occur during the exploitation and 
production of oil. There is also the possibility that human life could be affected as a 
result of the environmental damage caused by oil production. Humans suffer from en-
vironmental consequences through the damage to livestock, farms, and the human 
body itself. Oil spillage can also interfere with the normal working of power stations 
and desalination plants that require a continuous flow of clean seawater (E&P Fo-
rum/UNEP 1997). 
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Figure 5.3 Ogoniland oil spill in Nigeria 
Source: Businessday online (2011) 
 
A typical example of environmental pollution as illustrated in figure 7.3 as a result of an 
oil spill could be cited in Nigeria. In the Nigerian coastal environment, large areas of 
the mangrove ecosystem have been destroyed. The mangrove was thought to be a 
fuel wood for the indigenous people and a habitat for the area‟s biodiversity, but now 
unable to survive the oil toxicity of its habitat (Nwilo & Badejo 2005). Oil spill in Niger 
delta has been a regular occurrence, and resultant degradation of the environment has 
caused significant tension between the local people living in the region and the multi-
national companies (International Monetary Fund 2005). The recent United Nation re-
ports on oil spill in Ogoniland in the delta state reveals that it could take about 30years 
for the people of Ogoniland to recover fully from the oil damage. The study concludes 
that restoration of the environment to its original state could make it the world‟s big-
gest and long term clean up. Another example of environmental damage caused by oil 
spillage can be seen in the Gulf of Mexico where BP, a British oil company, was in-
volved in the Deepwater Horizon accident causing a huge oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. 
Large quantities of oil spill that got to the shoreline as a result of the accident at deep 
water area affected negatively the environments of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and 
Florida (BP Sustainability Reports 2010). 
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In summary, usually, the costs to the oil exporting nations are in these forms: slow in 
economic growth than expected; weak economic diversification; unencouraged social 
welfare; high levels of poverty, lack of equity and employment; higher than average 
corruption; governance is poor; dictatorship rule, weak rule of law; rent-seeking be-
haviour; often environmental destructions; abuse of human rights; and higher possibil-
ity of regional conflict and war.  
6 Ghana’s experience with the mining industry: Gold, bauxite and 
manganese 
6.1 Economic impact of mining in Ghana 
 
Mining activities contributed to Ghana‟s economy positively in one way while affected 
the economy negatively in another way. Some of the mixed impacts are explained be-
low.  
6.1.1 A boom in mining activities 
 
Ghana‟s mining industry has strong potential to generate taxes and associated revenue 
and employment, strongly enough to bring greater economic gains to the country and 
improved livelihood for the people (Akabzaa 2000). However, multinational companies 
enjoy high concessions of taxes from the government as a means of incentives to at-
tract them. This form of taxation affects government‟s earnings and therefore hinders 
national economic development programmes. Positively, there has been a boom in 
mining activities in Ghana after the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) jointly saw to the implementation of the structural adjustment program (SAP) in 
Ghana. Since the implementation of the reforms in 1983 to present, the sector has 
seen higher growth in investment, mostly in the gold sector. In addition, the sector has 
attracted a number of mining support companies such as catering, transport, housing 
and security companies (Akabzaa 2000). The sector now accounts for more than 30 
percent of gross foreign exchange earnings as can be seen in table 8.1 
 
Table 8.1 Contribution of mining sector to gross exports value 
Source: Ghana mineral commission (2007) 
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Years/US$(millions)  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Total export 1431.2  1936.3 1867.1 2015.2 2602.6 2739.2 2836.2 
Total mineral ex-
port 
679.9 756.0 691.4 753.9 893.6 880.0 995.2 
Minerals % of ex-
port 
47.44 39.04 37.03 37.41 34.33 32.1 35.1 
 
6.1.2 Underdevelopment 
 
However, a majority of the Ghanaian population feels that despite the vast improve-
ment in the mining sector, this has not added to the integrated economic development 
and increased social well-being or livelihood security nor has it reduced the vulnerabil-
ity of local communities (Akabzaa and Darimani 2001; Aryeetey, Osei and Twerefou 
2004). Aryeetey et al (2004) claim that despite improved performance of the sector as 
the preferred destination of Foreign direct investment (FDI) and dominant gross for-
eign exchange earner, this has not reflected visibly on the performance of the national 
economy. The benefits of the industry have been unfairly appropriated by the mining 
firms and a limited number of elites who benefit in the form of consultations, rent-
seeking and other dubious activities, while other traditional rulers benefit from the roy-
alties at the neglect of their community citizens (Aryeetey et al. 2004). Indeed, the 
current economic situation in Ghana suggests that the country has not seen massive 
economic development despite a significant improvement in investment of the mining 
industry. This argument implies that the improved investment in this industry could 
have transformed the livelihoods of the towns in and around the mining area, and also 
contributed to employment and government revenues. With Ghana lying relatively low 
on the United Nation (UN) Human Development Index, ranking 131, there is explicit 
evidence that shows that poverty is widespread in Ghana (United Nations Development 
report 2006). 
 
It has been observed that the country is deficient of a significant number of reliable 
programmes on a medium to long term basis for the utilization and consolidated de-
velopment of mineral resources (African Economic Outlook 2010). The governance of 
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the sector by weak legislation that is sometimes contradictory makes it impossible for 
the country to achieve the needed national economic development goal. 
6.2 Social impact of mining in Ghana 
 
Mining extraction also affects indirectly the socio-cultural environment of a country. 
Such social impacts ranges from health, conflicts, drug related issues and other social 
vices such as prostitution and alcoholism. 
6.2.1 Health issues 
 
A survey conducted at Obuasi hospital, a health facility in a popular gold mining town 
called Obuasi in the Ashanti region of Ghana revealed a high prevalence of upper respi-
ratory tract infection in the area which medical experts in the area say this was as a 
result of the mining activities and associated pollution (Awudi 2002). At Tarkwa, an-
other popular mining town in the western region of Ghana, mining impact related dis-
eases such as malaria, diarrhoea, upper respiratory tract infection, skin disease and 
accidents constitutes the top ten health problems in that town according to a survey 
conducted by Friends of the earth (FOE) in Ghana at Korle-Bu hospital in 2001 (Awudi 
2002). The area has the highest rate of malaria infection in the western region and the 
entire country as a whole. Skin rashes are widespread in the area especially those at 
the river areas and streams which regularly are contaminated by leaked cyanide waste 
waters (Akabzaa and Darimani 2001). 
6.2.2 Conflict issues 
 
At Tarkwa, there have been series of violent clashes between the local population and 
the mining companies. This occurred when the communities believed they have not 
been properly compensated for lost farmlands. Under-valuation of property to relocate 
the people has also seen massive agitation between them and the mining firms. Fur-
thermore, in 2002, the youth in the Tarkwa community embarked on a wakeup call to 
demand a share of the royalties for massive developmental projects such as portable 
drinking water, sanitary facilities and other infrastructure, emphasising that the share 
that was paid to the local authorities in the area has not been used for the overall bet-
terment of the people in the community (Tsekpo 2002).  
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In addition, a number of social vices such as prostitution, drug related problems, di-
vorce and sexually transmitted diseases such as AIDS are prevalence in the mining 
communities at Tarkwa in the western region of Ghana and another major mining town 
called Obuasi. 
6.3 Environmental impact of mining in Ghana 
 
Countries that engage in natural resource extraction activities are without some dam-
ages to their environments. Water and land pollution could be cited as some of the 
environmental consequences associated with the extraction industry. 
6.3.1 Water pollution 
 
Small scale mining operations in Ghana have polluted a number of water bodies such 
as rivers and streams in the mining communities by discharging solid suspension and 
mercury during sluicing and amalgamation. This has led to coloration and chemical 
pollution of rivers and streams that provides drinking water for the mining communities 
(Aryeetey et al 2004). 
6.3.2 Land degradation  
 
Furthermore, land degradation has occurred in most mining communities in the Wassa 
West district where lands that used to be fertile for farming activities are no longer 
fertile and as a result farming activities have reduced drastically. The mining activities 
on these lands have degraded lands and forest and destroyed the vegetation, including 
economic timber species and the ability of natural forest to regenerate. 
 
In a nutshell, there is ample evidence that shows how mining activities have contrib-
uted immensely to foreign direct investments and export earnings in Ghana. This no 
doubt added significantly to government tax mobilisation and revenue gains. However, 
poor institutional structural establishment coupled with corrupt practices and unfavour-
able mining laws have dwindled down the positive effects these benefits could have 
brought to Ghana‟s economy. This is also a clear indication that, the structural adjust-
ment program enforced on Ghana‟s economy by its‟ major creditors, the IMF and the 
World Bank, with the motive for transforming Ghana‟s economy has failed. However, 
the IMF and the World Bank have been reluctant to reverse this effect on Ghana‟s 
economy, perhaps due to their strong connections with multinational corporations. The 
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Multinational corporations are the major economic beneficiaries in Ghana due to the 
World Bank and the IMF initiated programme known as the Structural Adjustment Pro-
gramme.   
7   Countering the oil curse 
 
There are certain internationally accepted measures that oil-rich countries could follow 
to realise the benefits that their countries must get from their oil wealth. The focus on 
government is natural: these actions will work only if government leads the way. How-
ever, this will also require concerted efforts from their populations, international com-
munities, international oil corporations and their home governments, and those in con-
suming nations to help enforce these measures. The World Bank (2009) argues that 
“Ghana‟s reserves are relatively modest by international standards, and will thus not 
radically transform Ghana‟s economy into one where oil becomes the major sector”. 
However, its quantity is huge enough to deeply transform the economy of a non-oil 
country either positively or negatively. Ghana should as a matter of economic prosper-
ity adhere to the managerial principles elaborated below. 
7.1 Handling the macro-economics of the oil fortune 
 
The directions and strategies involved with turning the oil fortune into macro-economic 
blessings are discussed in this section. 
7.1.1 Oil wealth investments and savings  
 
First, development depends on a mixed economy, in which both public and private 
investments add to economic growth (Sachs & Warner 1999:174). Public investments 
are needed to finance two kinds of goods: public and merit. Public goods are goods 
that would not be produced in a market system that is free simply because of compa-
nies‟ inability to charge adequately for their use. This is because of its two unique 
characters: they are non-excludable (once the goods are provided, it is inevitable to 
exclude people who haven‟t paid from using them) and non-rival (this means when 
people consume goods, the amount does not reduce for other users (Biz/ed 1996). 
Some examples are environmental protection, national defence, the rule of law and a 
basic infrastructure network (roads, power, and sanitation). Merit goods however, are 
goods that would be produced in a market that is free but would not be sufficiently be 
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provided by firms. Examples of such goods are basic health care, basic education, so-
cial insurance for unemployment and disability, safe drinking water and sanitation 
(Biz/ed 1996). The provision of merit goods to the poorest members of the society has 
indirect benefits for the entire society in the form of enhanced political and social sta-
bility which implies positive externalities (Warner 1995). 
 
Coupled with this, public investments should be based on a “sound macroeconomic 
strategy, meaning a budgetary framework that preserves both short-run macroeco-
nomic stability and long-term fiscal solvency” (Sachs & Warner 1999:175). Macroeco-
nomic stability describes price stability, and the nonexistence of sudden cuts in spend-
ing that occur from a sudden worsening of credit terms. Fiscal solvency, of course, 
means the management of the public sector to maintain the ability to service public 
debts without crisis. The investment framework should consider the characteristic in-
stability of oil earnings on a year-to-year basis, and eventual depletion of oil reserves. 
Because of both depletion and volatility, a “sustained” level of oil income flows should 
be separated from the oil earnings in any particular year. Relying on the sustained pro-
file of oil income, a sound public investment profile should be adopted for incorporation 
into annual and medium-term budget frameworks.  
 
Third, public investment spending should be seen as a complement rather than substi-
tute for private investment spending. In reality, this means defining explicitly the re-
spective roles of the public and private sectors in the economy. Public investments 
should be focused on public goods and merit goods as discussed earlier, allowing the 
private sector free to build a private-owned economy alongside the public investments. 
 
Fourth, the public investment spending should be part of a development strategy with 
a time frame of a decade or more, since many public investments have long lead 
times. If public investment projects are done too quickly, inefficiencies are bound to 
increase because of limited absorptive capacity in the domestic economy. For example, 
increased physical investments in health and agriculture are far more effective when 
combined with long-term training for workers in those sectors, to avoid skill shortages 
and other bottlenecks (Sachs & Warner 1999:176). 
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The key recommendation is that oil earnings in low-income countries such as Ghana 
should be invested in public goods rather than spending it heavily on private consump-
tion in order to break out of a poverty trap. Most poor countries are severely chal-
lenged in their development by the underprovision of public goods. Economic devel-
opment, though requiring a predominance of the private sector in agriculture, industry, 
and services, also depends on core public goods (Humphreys et al. 2007). These are 
generally deficient in poor countries, sometimes so much that their absence retards 
investments by the private sector and leaves countries in poverty trap. The poverty 
trap works as follows: poverty → Lack of public finance →Lack of public goods →Lack 
of private investment →Poverty. 
 
Last, the real fear of the Dutch disease, in summary, is that the non-oil export sector 
will shrink, thereby crippling a major source of technological improvement in the econ-
omy. However, this Dutch disease nightmare can be mitigated if the oil proceeds are 
used to finance public investment as part of a national development strategy (Hum-
phreys et al. 2007). Let us assume that the rents from the oil earnings are being in-
vested in infrastructure (roads, power and telecom). Suppose for the moment that all 
of the investment goods are directly imported by the government with the oil rents. 
There is no direct spending effect of oil income in the country. Consumption raises to 
the extent that the non-oil sector (both traded and non-traded) expands as a result of 
increased public investments sponsored with the oil income. Production and consump-
tion of both traded goods and non-oil traded goods increase. The real exchange rate at 
current equilibrium may or may not appreciate relative to the initial equilibrium, but 
this does not matter very much, since the non-oil traded goods sector expands con-
tinuously at any given event. It expands as a result of the increased productivity due to 
public investment. 
 
In summary, the Dutch disease becomes a problem when the oil wealth is used to fi-
nance consumption rather than investment. This means the non-oil traded industry 
could shrink on a sustained basis, with negative implications for long period growth. 
The probability of this occurring is slim when oil wealth is used for public investments 
in economies such as that of Ghana which is deficient of public goods, especially infra-
structure. In that case, the positive effects of increased public investments on the non-
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oil traded sector are very likely to outweigh any negative consequences of real ex-
change rate appreciation. 
 
Oil-rich poor countries have sometimes been urged to establish a national financial 
savings fund (sometimes held in foreign stocks and bonds) and to spend only the in-
come on the financial assets in that fund. The idea is to create an endowment fund 
that will be used to finance public outlays into the future, for example, pension bene-
fits. Sachs and Warner (1995) contend that this kind of advice identifies that with a 
depleting asset like oil, there is a strong course for smoothing consumption (balancing 
savings and spending) over a much longer time frame than the depleting income flow 
from the oil itself. However, policy makers face a choice among four kinds of long-
lasting assets: oil in the ground, financial assets (e.g., foreign exchange reserves), 
physical assets (e.g., roads), and human capital (e.g., a better educated labour force).  
 
For poor countries such as Ghana, it is much more sensible to turn oil earnings quickly 
into physical assets and human capital. It may even make sense in these countries to 
borrow against future oil earnings for the sake of increasing investment outlays on 
high-return public investments (World Bank 2009). However, this latter option requires 
great thorough assessment because of the volatility of world oil prices and capital mar-
kets. 
7.1.2 Exchange rate policy 
 
In a normal situation where the real exchange rate tends to increase in the wake of an 
increase in oil booms, government policy makers can create that appreciation in two 
ways. First, the central bank maintains a floating exchange rate (a volatile exchange 
rate determined by the private market through supply and demand). The oil wealth 
creates an improvement of the nominal exchange rate (the official quote of an ex-
change rate) vis-å-vis the dollar and euro. This puts downward pressure on the local 
currency prices of non-oil traded products which leads to a fall in the prices of traded 
goods in relation to non-traded products (i.e., a real appreciation). Second, the nomi-
nal exchange rate of the national currency is pegged to the U.S dollar, or euro. Now 
the increase in domestic spending that occurs due to increased oil production leads to 
a rise in prices of non-traded goods, while traded goods prices are kept at a constant 
because of the constancy of the nominal exchange rate. Once again there is a fall in 
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traded good‟s price compared to non-traded good‟s price (i.e., a real appreciation) 
(Sachs & Warner 1999: 187). 
 
Sachs and Warner (1999:187) maintain there is no decisive case as to which of these 
mechanisms is to be implemented. For small countries like Ghana challenged with large 
structural transformations, instability in the demand for local currency and the uncer-
tainties of oil and capital flows, there is probably a preference for maintaining an “ad-
justable peg” exchange rate, wherein the central bank keeps the nominal exchange 
rate stable, but reserves the option to make devaluations or revaluations in the future. 
(When oil prices fall suddenly, for example, the central bank might undertake a de-
valuation to reduce non-traded good‟s relative price). It is perfectly possible that the 
exchange rate appreciates, and also that the non-oil tradable production expands. 
Again, in poor countries like Ghana with large deficient infrastructure, the productivity 
gains in the non-oil tradable sector that result from new infrastructure investments 
(especially in power, roads, telecoms, and port facilities) are likely to overshadow any 
negative effects on production caused by exchange rate appreciation due to public 
investment spending. This conclusion will at least apply over a period of a few years 
(enough time for the infrastructure to get into place). Therefore, the notion that the 
government should withhold investment spending in order to avoid real improvement 
of the exchange rate, in order to protect the non-oil tradable sector, is very likely to be 
wrong in practice. 
7.2 Ensuring fairness and equity of oil wealth distribution 
 
One crucial path to success is concerned with managing the effect that the oil wealth 
has on income distribution: this includes the vertical distribution of income (between 
rich and poor) and the horizontal distribution of income (across regions of a country). 
Inequality of these kinds can be catastrophic: the increase in vertical inequality may 
discourage development, and can lessen the poverty-reducing powers of economic 
development (World Bank 2001); horizontal inequality---and sudden changes in hori-
zontal inequality---can lead to violent conflict (Stewart 2009). Some of the major re-
sponses to counter these effects are discussed below. 
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7.2.1 Oil income distribution 
 
An oil boom can have negative implications on the labour force. This can occur in the 
form of vertical inequality: the large gap between rich and poor. This menace can re-
sult from the existence of the Dutch disease, where other industries of an oil-producing 
country‟s economy are crippled by the oil industry, thereby displacing most of the 
workforce. A prudent approach to deal with this negative effect on the economy is, 
first, that any nation that suspects a significant increase in oil and gas money should 
establish research on how growth in the oil and gas sector will affect the distribution of 
income. Failing to work on these effects will likely make it more difficult to deal with 
the growing inequalities when they occur. If research suggests that oil revenues will 
widen the gap between rich and poor, government can institute some types of solu-
tions: first, they can try to compensate the job losses in the agriculture and manufac-
turing sectors by promoting productivity and export growth; second, they can create 
new government jobs to give employments to displaced workers in these sectors; and 
third, they can implement targeted pro-poor policies (Ross 2006). 
 
Indonesia‟s strategies offer a good illustration, and provide a sharp contrast to Nige-
ria‟s policies. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Indonesian government adopted many pro-
grams targeted toward the poor, including universal primary education, price controls 
on food and fuel, and rural public works projects; the Nigerian government did nothing 
comparable. The Indonesian government also took measures to enhance agricultural 
production and to devalue the exchange rate, allowing exports to remain competitive 
and avoiding the collapse in agricultural exports that hurt the rural poor in Nigeria 
(Bevan et al. 1999).  
 
Changes in horizontal inequalities (the gap between oil-rich regions and oil-poor re-
gions) can be achieved through direct distribution (sharing oil money directly among 
citizens) and decentralization (distribution of oil revenue at sub-national level) of oil 
revenue. However, these methods are likely to fail in oil-rich developing countries due 
to the weak nature of their state institutions. Prudent measures that can accentuate 
the gap between these categories of regions are: first, giving oil companies incentives 
to employ local people and to buy products that are locally made as part of the deal 
regarding the offer of the operating license.  
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Second, adopting strategies that would discourage workers from migrating into the oil 
producing towns. A resource abundant mostly pulls poorly paid workers from other 
regions of the country, or from other countries. The number of available jobs for the 
local citizens is lessened by the migrants and this mostly result in social tension. For 
example, in Indonesia, tensions between locals and migrants around mining projects 
helped spark separatist movements (Ross 2006). Temporal migration limitation can 
help reduce these tensions that would increase the oil gains for local peoples. 
 
Third, ensuring transparent practices for all revenues from oil production. This could 
help dismiss any false information to the local population concerning the amount and 
distribution of oil rents. 
 
Fourth, encouraging mediation by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) between 
indigenous population and oil firms. Mostly, worry of differences exist between indige-
nous people, who have issues about the environmental, economic, and social reper-
cussions  of oil exploration, and a greater number of foreign companies, who doesn‟t 
do enough to address local problems and concerns. These differences can be resolved 
by NGOs: they can help implement local development activities that are financed with 
oil wealth; keep track of companies and government activities, and other actors; con-
vene adversarial parties, making them more transparent and accountable (Ross 2001). 
 
Furthermore, full centralization of oil money with regards to income distribution, with 
carefully constructed transfers to governments of sub-regions is the first-best option 
(Amad & Mottu 2003). Recognising that maintaining this option is often difficult in po-
litical view, their second-best recommendation is to allow sub-regional governments to 
impose relatively small, stable types of petroleum taxes such as production excise 
taxes while the national government impose taxes and royalties that capture the more 
volatile forms of revenue. Amad and Mottu (2003) again suggest any sub-national pe-
troleum taxes be supported by more stable revenue sources. They say comparing this 
to revenue-sharing arrangements, this arrangement will help sustain accountability 
among sub-regional governments, make easier government‟s macroeconomic planning, 
and maintain stability in financing sub-regional governments for local services. 
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7.2.2 Fiscal social contract implementation 
 
The root problems to social contract transparency are political and institutional (Karl 
1997a). Overcoming these problems must begin with political and institutional agree-
ments. First there should be a transparent fiscal social contract: a relationship that help 
prohibits the rent-seeking behaviour of all stakeholders, both domestic and interna-
tional in the oil business. There should be the existence of a consolidated relationship 
agreement among countries and their citizens, firms, and international financial groups 
to be more transparent about the sharing of oil wealth so that a fair distribution can be 
realised. To succeed in this, three types of “stateness” deficits that include information, 
monitoring, and participation must be resolved (Karl 1997b). The information deficit 
could be addressed when oil governments‟ exhibits vital strategic approach, for exam-
ple, the types of profitable businesses that should be encouraged or how income dis-
tribution pattern are changing, and the existence of robust tax bureaucracy. This in-
formation gives citizens the opportunity to assess whether their personal interest in 
government‟s expenditure processes are viable and effective. Also, the monitoring 
shortfall could be eradicated through the availability of revenue incentives to establish 
or adhere to regulations by producers of the economy; it is further improved by decen-
tralizing power inside the executive that promotes meaningful checks and balances, 
and also subjects energy firms to massive checks, both in firms‟ home country and 
country of operation. Lastly, the deficit of participation occurs as a result of weak link-
ages between the citizenry and the oil government. This situation could be averted 
through strong links and relationships among citizens and the state, which legitimise 
the ownership of public resources as the citizens of an oil state. When citizens are 
taxed regardless of the amount of the oil wealth, they develop a rentier culture to track 
governments of the resource management. The oil rents should be managed in a di-
rection where rulers would still need to depend on the productivity of their subjects to 
raise revenues. This in effect would involve full participation of citizens in ensuring 
prudent usage of rents from the public resources. 
7.3 Dealing with oil companies 
 
Activities between the state and the multinational oil companies, ensuring their inclu-
sion in the oil extraction and production activities are elaborated in the sentences be-
low. 
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7.3.1 Auction process 
 
Auctions allocate and price resources in settings of uncertainty (Klemperer 2002). Auc-
tions are a formal and transparent approach that answers the question: who should 
win the item and at what value? (Ausubel & Cramton 1998). A core benefit of auction 
is its ability to release the block to bidders with the best ability to operate it. The com-
petitive nature of auctions creates an environment where companies with the highest 
estimates of value for the block are likely to bid higher than the others (Klemperer 
2002). Auctions are mostly preferred to informal processes of allocating oil exploitation 
and production right due to the fact that the latter which is also known as first-come-
first-serve allocation, encourages corruption and favouritism and also lack transpar-
ency, which discourage competition which in turn leads to inefficiency of the exercise 
and revenues for the countries. Again, the latter encourage expropriation. Ausubel and 
Cramton (1998) assert that an administrative process, also known as “beauty contest” 
in which oil firms deliver plans for exploration and development following a formal 
process. This option may be of high flexible than auctions, but lacks transparency and 
is more prone to favouritism and corruption. In order to ensure sanity in the auction 
process, certain rules must be followed: first, the process should commence with the 
advertisement of the tender in public, and be open to all firms on a non-discriminatory 
manner. Second, issuing license to firms should follow certain complete procedures, 
including the qualification procedure of a bidder and the rules governing the auction. 
Third, the country should abide by the process. Finally, the process should permit for 
and support input from oil companies in a transparent setting that requires announce-
ment of the content of meetings in public between the country and the oil companies 
(Ausubel & Cramton 1998). Bids and the participation of bidder are increased if con-
cerns of a legitimate bidder and preferences are addressed. 
7.3.2 Bidder preference             
 
The two categories of bidder preference that influence auction design are known as: 
interdependence of valuations across bidders and the interdependence of valuation 
across blocks (Ausubel & Cramton 1998). Interdependence of valuations across bidders 
is grouped in three different preferences: First, the private value which means the 
value of each bidder is independent of the private information of the other bidders. 
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Each bidder has its own valuation of the anticipated worth of the variety of items on 
sale. Second, the common values are when items in packages have the same value to 
all bidders. But these values are not known. The value can be stated based on private 
information of individual bidders, as well as the information held by other bidders. A 
bidder‟s strong ability to estimate an item‟s value depends on how well it has informa-
tion about other bidder‟s item valuations. Lastly, if interdependence values occur, then 
each bidder‟s package value depends on his private information as well as other bid-
ders‟ private information (Klemperer 2002). This is a more general valuation and both 
private and common values can be stated as special cases of interdependence values. 
In most cases all oil rights settings are examples of a common values auction. A com-
mon value (the world oil price) is what firms use to set their values. However, the un-
certainty concerning oil quantity and extraction cost is resolved by firms resorting to 
private value auctions to have other bidders‟ private information (Ausubel & Cramton 
1998). 
 
Interdependence of valuations across blocks: this is primarily concerned about the 
structure of package values. The first model of valuation is known as additive values: 
the package‟s value is the values of the individual blocks in a sum. Oil rights auctions 
mostly employ additive values as the best approximation (Klemperer 2002). However, 
occasionally subadditive or superadditive value is used. The Package‟s value is less 
than the total of the individual values with the subadditive values, and a package‟s 
value is greater than the sum of the individual values with the superadditive values 
(Ausubel & Cramton 1998). 
7.3.3 Auction design    
Oil rights auctions mostly have the following design options: bonus bid and royalties or 
production sharing (Klemperer 2002). The bonus bid is the deposit made in advance in 
auction for the exploration right and the block development in the license period. How-
ever, this kind of design is problematic in the light of expropriation risk for companies. 
The royalty is the government‟s share of the oil wealth. The shortfall of royalties is 
that, like a tax, it retards decisions on investment. A large royalty rate serves as a dis-
incentive for the oil company. Production-sharing contracts (PSCs) involve specifying 
cost and profit sharing throughout exploration and development of the blocks (Klem-
perer 2002). Mostly, PSCs are suitable for developing oil-rich nations with little upfront 
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fees and high government shares when oil finds are successful. PSCs lessen oil firm 
risk and better deal with investment attractions through the specification of cost and 
profit sharing during exploration and development. It is most favourable to companies 
because it can enable companies gain back exploration and development cost before 
revenues shares for the country. Afualo and McMillan (1996) claim that bidding over 
the government‟s highest profit share is notable with PSCs. Thus, there are competi-
tions among bidders on their eagerness to divide profits in the most favourable ways. 
This approach was recently deployed in Libya, lowers risk for oil firm without destruc-
ting development incentives, since the bid shares only apply for highly successful 
blocks (Johnston 2005). Government‟s contributions to the costs of development and 
operation further increase the development incentives.  
7.4 Setting the oil revenue management law 
 
Various dealings concerning the oil production and its revenue should be governed by 
certain rules and regulations to ensure prudent management. Below are some vital 
discussions to that effect.     
7.4.1 Account establishment 
 
An oil account is established for various purposes. It could be a tool for monitoring oil 
financial gains, a stabilization fund to absorb fluctuation of prices of oil, or a saving 
device to create a permanent fund to cater for the future of the citizens of a state 
(Sunley et al. 2002). Practically, a number of primary decisions must be adopted in 
establishing a successful oil account: first, should the account be a trust fund, a special 
account, another subaccount of government deposits held by the Central Bank, a sepa-
rate account or accounts kept at the treasury? Second, should the account be kept at 
institutions abroad or home? Last, what are the requirements regarding custodian 
qualifications and the manner the custodian should be selected (Bell & Faria 
2006:288). It is advisable for an oil fund to be kept separate from the normal govern-
ment account and entrusted to the hands of a custodian institution. The funds are pre-
ferred to be held offshore and the holdings be established in international currencies. 
This preference is mostly applicable to oil-rich developing nations such as Ghana be-
cause: holding a domestic oil account would serve as an incentive to the “Dutch dis-
ease” syndrome (Sunley et al. 2002). Also majority of local banking systems lack the 
control and strength relevant to maintain sanity and security of an oil account, consid-
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ering the potential magnitude of oil deposits. Furthermore, the choice of a local institu-
tion to manage and maintain the account has a higher tendency to be influenced politi-
cally. However, the latter is also possible with offshore accounts but with a lower prob-
ability. 
7.4.2 Oversight and control 
 
The mobilization, management and utilization of all oil-earned revenues should be sub-
ject to broad and detailed oversight and control (Bell 2000). Oversight and controls 
should require periodic and public reports by the group assigned with this task. Over-
sight and controls should also be carried out by a parliamentary commission including 
some opposition members, governmental bodies and some civil society groups (Bell & 
Faria 2006). For example, in Sao Tome and Principe, the oil revenue law enacted a 
new body that was independent, the petroleum oversight and control commission, 
made up of governmental, parliamentary and civil society members. The commission is 
mandated with oil revenues monitoring and management and assuring the revenue 
management law implementation, and has significantly been charged with investigative 
powers (Bell & Faria 2006).  
 
Bell and Faria (2006) contend that periodic auditing of the oil account is a vital tool of 
accountability. There should be an accounting method specification in an oil revenue 
management law that the oil account should follow, and require all transaction of the 
oil account to undergo annual auditing by an independent world acclaimed accounting 
institution that uses accounting methods accepted worldwide, selected by open and 
public procurement. The law should also states that audits, any back-up papers, and 
special reports be presented to governmental agencies and made public (Bell 2000). 
7.4.3 Transparency 
 
The most important issues with any law governing oil revenues management are the 
transparency requirement and the establishment of policies that sustain such transpar-
ency. In general, all information pertaining to oil revenue should be declared publicly 
without any alteration. Oil-rich nations should join any international advocates of 
transparency such as Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). For example, 
in a collaborative development zone controlled by both Nigeria and Sao Tome and 
Principe, their leaders signed a declaration of principles at Abuja, which requires indi-
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vidual company data disclosed and of contracts by the governing authority and the 
companies (IMF 2005). Information should be made available through any convenient 
medium such as creation of information centre, the internet and daily news papers. All 
oil revenue management laws should include no-bribery and procurement compliance 
representations, public announcement obligations as well as statement conditioning 
the effectiveness of the agreement or contract on full adhesion with applicable gov-
ernment contract laws (Bell & Faria 2006). 
7.4.4 Law sustenance   
 
An ultimate issue for an oil management law is how to institute practical and legal re-
straints that will prevent future governments from abolishing or evading the law while 
at the same moment ensuring flexibility to meet changing conditions (Bell 2000). For 
instance, some countries make it possible for the existence of special supermajority 
legislative agreement and requirements of referenda for changes in the law.  
 
Another strategy to ensure sustenance of the law on oil rents management is to deploy 
a constitutional amendment tackling vital issues. A constitutional change would 
strongly improve the controls over the mobilization and oil revenues usage, and would 
restrain but not prevent any party‟s ability to unilaterally change the rules governing 
the oil account (Bell & Faria 2006). A change could reaffirm vital principles of the oil 
revenue management law. It might state that all petroleum resources and the reve-
nues earned belong to the nation and must not be tempered and that all monies from 
such resources must be transferred to the oil account, that all monies from the oil ac-
count can be made available only for particular specified use (Bell 2000). Whatever 
form the oil fund may be structured, however, legislators and their supporting authori-
ties must realise that without well established supporting institutions, the law may only 
be on paper. Eventually, huge patronage rather than good drafting is the ultimate sig-
nificant sustaining instrument, however, a well drafted law may help heighten and 
build that support (Bell and Faria 2006). Again, Bell and Faria (2006) assert that there 
is a potential of a virtuous circle in which a successful and sustained law promotes 
stronger popular constituencies who in turn will act to advocate and maintain the law.    
7.5 Countries experience with oil wealth management 
Oil has been exploited in many developed and developing countries and its potential 
effects have differed among them. Specifically, most of the oil-rich developed nations 
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have performed well whilst most developing nations have turned oil fortune into an 
economic curse. Let consider the experiences of Norway which has used its oil revenue 
wisely to the benefit of its entire population as against Nigeria, a developing country, 
which has misused its vast resource wealth to the detriments of its citizens.   
7.5.1 Economic volatility reduction 
 
Before the oil discovery, Norway already had strong and effective institutions, reliable 
and trusted legal systems, and a high level of industrialization in place which helped 
made the managements of its oil revenue more profitable (Torvik 2008). Norway‟s pe-
troleum fund has served as both stabilization and savings funds that have contributed 
to the build up of financial deposits during periods of high prices of oil and increasing 
economic activity. These reserves are drawn as a financial buffer against decrease in 
revenue, or in the long-run as oil production declines and social expenditure increases 
to make up for the non-oil budget deficit thus contributing to the overall fiscal balance 
of the economy. On the contrary, the Nigerian government is highly dependent on oil 
revenues; it derives 95 percent of its total revenue mobilisation from oil (IMF 2005). It 
has deviated from the traditional revenue mobilization pattern and as such revenues of 
government changes with respect to oil exports value. This tends to make the fiscal 
policy of government an overbearing influence on the economy.  
7.5.2 Democratic prosperity 
 
An effort has been made to immunize the oil fund in Norway from political interference 
by handling its management over to an independent central bank. In Norway, there 
exist little political differences and equality in society is valuable (Torvik 2008). The 
existence of transparency at the highest level in the processes of politics and bureauc-
racy has strengthened the general trust in the integrity of politicians as well as the 
professional skills of the civil service (Torvik 2008). Many Norwegians have no doubts 
in their minds about government‟s ability to manage effectively and honestly the oil 
wealth. Oppositely, in Nigeria, it is argued that the discovery of oil has impacted on its 
democratic system as politics are consistently shaped by access to revenues from oil by 
politicians. Subsequent political developments to this day have always been associated 
with oil revenue as politicians engage in all forms of corrupt practices such as rent-
seeking to capture the oil rents for political power. This has impacted negatively on the 
oil revenue mobilization to the state. Moreover, poor industrialization has also contrib-
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uted to a weak democracy in Nigeria since democracy is made strong by industrializa-
tion through creating an urban middle class, which in turn creates a stable platform for 
democratic institutions (IMF 2005). 
7.5.3 Inequality and conflict reduction 
 
When there is inequality in sharing, there is always dissatisfaction and eventually a 
conflict follows (Ross 2001). This was the situation in Nigeria. Oil has also contributed 
greatly to the recent conflicts in the Delta region. Majority of Nigeria‟s oil extraction 
occurs there and they suffer a significant magnitude of costs involved with the oil ex-
traction, and believe they have not been compensated adequately. What also fuelled 
this conflict is the incidence of high levels of poverty. Literacy rates, access to health 
services, and access to safety water are exceptionally low and unemployment is excep-
tionally high (World Bank 2005). Norway‟s experience tells a different story. Even be-
fore the discovery of oil, Norway‟s political culture was emphasised economic equality 
(Torvik 2008). This served as an incentive for the creation of the Norwegian welfare 
state. In the fourteenth century, it was known that a regional system was established 
which guaranteed work for the rural Norwegian poor. It is quite evident that today, 
economic equality is viewed as a tradition ingrained with the historical political culture 
of Norway instead of a reaction against entrenched inequality. This already existing 
practice has impacted positively on the equal distribution of the nation‟s vast revenue 
from the oil wealth. A sense of obligation to assist the poor, old, and sick is deeply 
rooted within Norwegian political culture. This obligation was made possible by the oil 
wealth through financing social welfare programs for its population (Torvik 2008). 
7.5.4 Transparency 
   
By and large, lack of transparency in Africa attributed to weak political and institutional 
structures (Ross 2001). Nigeria, since it started pumping oil has been marred by mas-
sive corruption and other dubious practices that have derailed its economic transforma-
tion goal. While oil has contributed to government‟s earning at US$ 400 billion since 
1970, standards of living have not improved (Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian 2003). 
Transactions on oil export and import produce large amount of returns but the non-
transparent practices involved encourage corruption. Mostly, little is known about the 
processes used to select winners of contracts or how much they are worth. The Nige-
rian press allege that officials often are bribed by the firms involved. Continuous mis-
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management of the four state refineries in Nigeria has yielded only around half of their 
combined potential capacity (UNDP 2000). The consequences are that majority of re-
fined petroleum used by its population are imported. However, Nigeria recently 
adopted the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) to put a stop to the 
high amount of oil revenue lost in the country both by locals and foreign partners. The 
initiative (NEITI) is woven around three basic tenets namely: the re-enactment of na-
tional ethics, law enforcement and institutional reforms. The NEITI was necessary be-
cause it encourages transparency in the payment and oil revenues receipt. This would 
provide reliable database to monitor government expenditure. It also enhances ac-
countability at all three tiers of government as well as the executive and legislation 
organs of government. Lastly, Nigeria derives 95% of its revenue from the oil industry 
hence transparency is capable of creating access to finance and investment at both 
national and global levels. In Norway, the unprecedented growth of its pension fund to 
about US$ 513 billion attests to the high level of transparency governing the manage-
ment of the fund (Olsen 2008). Norway‟s finance ministry (2010) argues that the fund 
has been well established that its goals are in conformity to financial sustainability 
rather than any secretive political dealings in secret, and its score was 100% for gov-
ernance, transparency and accountability in 2007 by the US based Peterson Institute 
for International Economies. The rules governing the management of the fund are 
simple: the central bank of Norway, which is made autonomous, on behalf of the min-
istry of finance maintains the fund. The finance ministry owns the fund on behalf of 
the Norwegian citizens. The ministry draft plans for the fund‟s investments strategy 
following advice from the central bank and discussion in parliament (Norway‟s finance 
ministry 2010).         
7.6 Solution relevant to Ghana‟s state of the economy 
 
Rapid growth of revenue from oil mostly occurs during the initial years of extraction. 
The mismanagement risk is however at its peak during these years (World Bank 2009). 
In the face of it, Ghana‟s current economic situation would be the best measure of 
what kind of prudent managerial principles to institute in governing the country‟s newly 
found resource wealth in order to curb the curse associated with resource finds. These 
key principles include: good governance and transparency, prudent macro-economic 
policies, and structural transformation.    
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7.6.1 Governance and transparency 
 
The government of Ghana promulgated its commitment in early 2009 to publicly an-
nounce petroleum agreements (OILIS 2010). This announcement was made in time as 
many were worried about the transparent way to manage the oil revenue so that the 
country does not suffer the same way as it did in the mining industry where even 
though Ghana adopted the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives (EITI) it 
never complied. However, the chairman of the parliamentary select committee on en-
ergy raised a complaint at a recent oil forum about lack of access to petroleum agree-
ment and contracts which raises so many questions about transparency in the oil in-
dustry (OILIS 2010). 
 
First, Ghana should listen to the call of its civil society to make its compliance to the 
EITI mandatory as its current voluntary compliance leaves worst offenders escape 
scrutiny. Again, the country should strengthen already adopted freedom of information 
acts by enforcing transparency and accountability operations in these dealings: publicly 
making available all data concerning revenues from oil and what they are used for, and 
also publicly making available the identity of a bidder and documents of bidding. This 
exercise could be done by EITI. Moreover, the strengthening of the parliamentary 
oversight committee on energy, sustaining community oversight function, and increas-
ing the capacity of agencies responsible for mobilizing revenue are all measures 
needed to kick out corruption in the oil sector. Ghana‟s institutional challenges are 
lessened by its strong democratic achievements. However, increased transparency and 
good governance, in turn should create an opportunity to establish a strong institu-
tional response to the risk of political influence on the oil revenues. Ghana has once 
more been offered the opportunity by the oil find to strengthen its democratic ethos 
through managing the oil resource and associated revenue in a transparent way. 
7.6.2 Macro-economic policy 
         
As oil revenue has started pouring into Ghana, there are two vital macro-economic 
challenges that need critical attention (World Bank 2009). First, is dealing with the 
volatility nature of amount produced and price of oil, and its unpredictable nature. 
Second, is the nature and present unfolding of recurrent fiscal imbalance. The latter, if 
not properly dealt with, will tempt the government to rely on oil revenue to finance 
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public consumption instead of financing relevant investment such as public goods. Oil 
price volatility in the world market and therefore oil fund does not support sound 
budget implementation and in essence, impedes planning development of investment 
of a medium-term framework (World Bank 2009). Practically, addressing the price 
volatility issue involves manipulating the oil revenue share to be deposited into the 
national budget, after which the rest are invested abroad (in the interest of separating 
these investments from Ghana‟s economic cycle). Foremost, there is the need to estab-
lish a stabilisation mechanism which is made up of establishing a reference price, usu-
ally, of the same size as the forecast price in the long-run, and depositing only the oil 
production rent estimated at the reference price to the state budget and keeping the 
rest in a stabilization fund if the actual price is higher, or make redrawals from this 
fund if the true price is lower (World Bank 2009). The second solution is made up of 
establishing a permanent income fund or heritage fund, with this fund, only the inter-
est of the rent from the accrued assets is transferred to the state budget. Global prices 
couple with real interest rates will be the key determinants of the earned money which 
can be utilized each year, even after the exhaustion of the oil reserves. 
 
Ratings agency, Standard & Poor‟s rated Ghana B/B, and said even though Ghana con-
tinues to benefit from strong GDP growth, strengthening oil production volumes, and 
political stability, the country continues to suffer from weak fiscal management high-
lighted by a widening of the fiscal deficit in 2010 and increased supplier arrears (Joy 
Business News 2011). This threatens the country‟s ability to rely on revenue from oil to 
finance needed projects. In recent years, its recurrent balance dropped by a figure 
above 6 percent of GDP (initial 8.3% GDP to 2.1% GDP) in many cases due to in-
creased public sector wages and energy subsidies (IMF 2009). To deal with this prob-
lem, first, the single spine payroll reforms, and energy cost recovery mechanisms 
should be implemented. According to the International monetary Fund (IMF), Ghana 
has a recurrent balance of 2 percent with a privilege historical 5 percent of GDP bor-
rowing, and therefore can only fund projects up to 7 percent of GDP, extremely less 
than the 10-11 percent required to resolve its infrastructure problem. The country may 
be tempted considering its fiscal imbalances as well as smoothing needs, seeking loan 
on conditional terms against oil money in the future to postpone fiscal consolidation 
would increase risk of debt accumulation (IMF 2009). IMF and World Bank (2009) ar-
gue that even in the presence of oil wealth, inability to lessen the large primary deficit 
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and maintain this consolidation over the future would result in a much less favourable 
debt sustainability outlook.     
7.6.3 Structural transformation 
 
Macro and micro economic indicators in Ghana suggest that commercial farming will 
suffer huge setback due to the rapid flow of oil money into the economy. Currently 
more than 70 percent of the rural poor dwell in rural communities where agriculture is 
prevalent. Agriculture will continue to be a major contributor to economic growth and 
also poverty alleviation goal even in the presence of rapid migration of rural folks to 
the urban communities as a result of the oil boom (World Bank 2009). No doubt rea-
sons exist to accept the fact that productivity growth in agriculture could be a major 
catalyst of industrialization and economic growth starter in Ghana. First, because agri-
cultural outputs serve as raw materials for the industry, directly for some industries 
(e.g., food cannery, textiles) and indirectly considering the effect it has on real wages. 
Second, because the productivity growth in agriculture has the potential to break the 
subsistence farming continuous cycle where all the agriculture outputs are utilized 
within the harvest period. In effect, productivity growth free workers or time for other 
activities, improves savings and investments, reduces farmers‟ setbacks, and thus 
strengthens their ability engage in productive risks (World Bank 2009). It also in-
creases industrial products demand, which is vital in the existence of fixed cost in in-
dustry. This, in turn, will serve as an incentive for industrialization. The agricultural 
productivity growth and diversification of the economy away from oil production could 
not take place without investing massively in public goods which is underprovided in 
Ghana (World Bank 2009). The Government through its investments programme must 
pay greater attention on providing a quality and adequate road network, portable 
drinking water, affordable health care, quality education, energy efficiency and an ex-
cellent telecommunication network across the country. For it is with these transforma-
tions that the economy of Ghana can expand and develop for the greater benefit of all 
its citizens. 
 
The environment should also be a major concern and priority to the government of 
Ghana. Certainly, as oil production starts, there would be some environmental chal-
lenges. There is the possibility of oil spill on the countries beaches and in the sea-
waters since Ghana‟s oil reserve is offshore. This would destroy the country‟s aquatic 
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eco-system and fisheries which would mean a major setback for Ghana‟s fishing indus-
try. To ensure protection for Ghana‟s environment, the government should inculcate 
environmental issues in the yet to be drawn petroleum bill demanding that companies 
accept full responsibility should any spill occur to the environment during their opera-
tion. The law should also demand a reliable plan from the oil companies on any pre-
ventive measures and how they will tackle any spillage should it occur to the environ-
ment.           
8 Conclusion 
 
Ghana‟s oil in commercial quantity started flowing at the last quarter of the year 2010. 
Already, several uninformed discussions have occurred following the find, which have 
done well only in raising Ghanaian citizen‟s expectations about the oil find. Each time 
oil was discovered in any part of Africa, there were always hues and cries about how 
the resource was going to be managed. Usually, it turns out to be a curse as a result of 
poor and inefficient management by the custodians of this resource. It is in the wake 
of this that Ghanaians have been too cautious about the management of their newly 
found oil resource. The issue of whether an oil discovery would be a blessing or a 
curse to Ghana is primarily dependent on the managerial principles and the model that 
would be deployed to manage the oil production and the revenues associated with it. 
Based on the discussions above, it is arguable that prudent macroeconomic policy, 
dealing with multinational corporations, revenue management laws, equity and fair-
ness, transparency and environmental concerns are paramount to realising the benefits 
that come from oil discovery. 
 
Oil revenues need not be a curse. When managed properly, they can help Ghana im-
prove upon its economy, especially by providing the public financing for critical invest-
ments in key public goods rather than financing consumption. The provision of public 
goods such as basic infrastructure is relevant since they are underprovided in Ghana. 
With this type of investment, the fears of the Dutch Disease are likely to be exagger-
ated. The absence of the Dutch disease syndrome would mean that every sector of the 
economy would perform well and this would overshadow the fear of the vertical ine-
quality that could occur. Given the changing nature of oil prices in the world couple 
with its depletion character, there should be a considerable manipulation of oil earning 
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share to be deposited in Ghana‟s national budget and invest the rest overseas to 
spread the benefits of the oil earnings across generations. Ghana‟s weak fiscal imbal-
ance could be solved through prudent reforms in the public payment structure, and the 
implementation of utility usage cost recovery mechanisms. 
 
Due to the capital intensiveness and the technological expertise requirements in this 
industry, it is inevitable to rely upon multinational companies in the exploitation and 
production of the oil resource. However, without managing their involvements properly 
could cause inconvenience to the Ghanaian economy. It is critical for Ghana to engage 
professionals to negotiate oil contracts with multinational oil companies so that con-
tracts will be accepted and honoured over time by future government. Mostly, auctions 
are favourable compared to informal processes that are characterised by favouritism, 
fraud, lack of competition, and non-transparent factors. Furthermore, production shar-
ing contracts in auction design takes into consideration the interest of oil companies by 
reducing their risk whilst increasing host country‟s profit share from the oil rents. 
 
Laws are essential to the governance of oil rents in any oil-rich nation. Ghana already 
enjoys the rule of law, but it is imperative, where necessary to amend the laws and 
create new ones as oil money has started flowing to ensure prosperity in its manage-
ment. It is preferable by law to establish an oil account to be held offshore as against 
domestic holdings. Domestic holdings could cause the Dutch disease syndrome and 
encourage custodian favouritism. Domestic banking also lacks controls and capacities 
to manage the large amount of oil rents. Oversight and control by law should be car-
ried out by a specific group, usually the parliamentary commission with members of 
diverse political affiliates and entrusted with significant investigative powers to effec-
tively carry out their duty without fear of intimidation and interference. Transparency is 
essential at every stage of oil management: macro-economic policies, environmental 
dealings, dealing with oil firms, governance and the provision of oil management laws. 
It must be noted that oil wealth alone do not guarantee proper management. They are 
managed by institutions whose activities must be operated transparently, so as to 
avoid mismanagement, misapplication, diversions and inadequate disclosures ( Adam 
2010). Ghana has already adopted the EITI, but its voluntary compliance leaves the 
country abandoning the purpose of the EITI. It is therefore necessary by law to make 
its compliance compulsory. The environment is also a matter of great concern during 
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the exploitation and production processes. Any oil spill could cause serious damages to 
the water bodies destroying the livelihood of the fishing community in the catchment 
area. The law is an essential tool that could be used to demand plans from oil firms on 
preventive measures that have been adopted to ensure spill-free operation; how they 
would tackle it should it occur ,and the willingness to accept responsibilities. Impor-
tantly, the law should be characterised by legal barriers to inhibit subsequent govern-
ments from abandoning it while also exercising flexibility to contain changing situa-
tions. 
 
As earlier stressed, Oil by itself does not produce economic growth. It is the manage-
rial practices that would determine its impact on the economy. The president of the 
Republic of Ghana John Atta Mills at a recent public forum said the government will 
prevent the pitfalls other African producers have fallen into, stressing that “we must 
set an example to all and sundry that when natural assets are utilized, they bring noth-
ing but benefit” (McLure 2010). If the president‟s words would translate into reality, all 
would depend on the adoption of the prudent managerial principles discussed above. 
With these principles, certainly, Ghana should not be seen after many years to come as 
a resource trap victim.                      
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Peaking in 2011-16, Oil Extraction could add US$1 Billion to Ghana’s 
Budget 
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Sao Tome’s Oil Fund 
 
The framework makes provisions for a number of additional windows of opportunity to 
increase transparency and accountability by placing the responsibility on the company 
to disclose information in an accessible form to a public information office and, if they 
fail to do so, they risk losing their contract. It also mandates, and gives wide ranging 
power to, an inclusive oversight mechanism which includes a broad base of eleven 
stakeholders, only one of which is appointed by the president (ministers, auditor gen-
eral, three civil society representatives etc.). The national assembly is also required to 
hold yearly public hearings on the performance of the fund (World Bank 2009).  
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Norway’s Oil Fund 
 
The fund is designed to manage accumulated budgetary surpluses and does not have 
specific rules for the accumulation or withdrawal of resources, making its operation 
flexible. Specifically, the budget transfers to the State Pension Fund (SPF) net oil reve-
nues. In turn, the SPF finances the budget‟s non-oil deficit through a reverse transfer 
(provided there are enough funds in the SPF). Thus, the SPF effectively finances the 
overall budget balance. An overall budget surplus would be transferred to the fund; a 
budget deficit would be financed by the fund. The accumulation of assets in the SPF, 
which includes return on the fund‟s capital, thus represents government net financial 
savings. The amount actually saved depends on oil prices and the fiscal stance as em-
bodied in the non-oil fiscal deficit. SPF assets are under the control of the ministry of 
finance and are managed by the central bank, with a high level of transparency and 
accountability. A key reason for establishing the SPF was the desire to make more 
transparent the intertemporal policy choices available to the country, related to the 
expected secular decline in oil and gas output and increase in pension outlays. In this 
context, the fund has helped to provide a long-term framework for the annual process 
of setting the non-oil budget deficit. The SPF is effectively a government account ra-
ther than a fund. Its features ensure integrity into a unitary fiscal system and address 
fungibility issue. The fund does not attempt to deal directly with the problems posed to 
the budget by the volatility of oil prices. The latter are addressed in the context of the 
standard budgetary process. The lack of restriction posed by the SPF has worked well, 
since Norway has typically followed sound fiscal and macroeconomic policies. Moreo-
ver, for a country like Norway, with a highly diversified production structure and a 
broad fiscal revenue base, oil revenue has typically accounted for less than 15 percent 
of government revenue, therefore, the challenge posed by oil price volatility to fiscal 
management is significantly less than for other oil producing nations (Humphreys 
2009). 
